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The negative relationship between host-country tax rates and FDI has been tested in
a large number of papers. This paper looks at a diﬀerent channel through which tax
systems could aﬀect FDI, namely the complexity of the tax system. Complying with tax
authority requirements can be extremely time consuming for business and this implies
an additional cost for more complex tax systems. We use measures of the time taken
to deal with tax obligations and the number of tax payments for a representative ﬁrm
compiled by the World Bank to examine their eﬀect on FDI selection and ﬂows from
16 OECD FDI-source countries to 57 host countries. We ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀect of tax rates in line with other studies. In addition, the tax complexity measures
are found to have a signiﬁcant inhibiting eﬀect on the presence of FDI for a country
pair, but have little impact on the level of the FDI ﬂow once it is established. In other
words, the complexity measures aﬀect FDI primarily through the extensive margin. A
10% reduction in tax complexity is found to be comparable in its eﬀect on FDI to a one
percentage point reduction in the eﬀective corporate tax rate. The results are robust
to the inclusion of other proxies for bureaucracy in the host country.
1Non-Technical Summary
The inﬂuence of taxes on foreign direct investment may be more complicated than a simple
comparison of rates across countries. This paper adds a further dimension to the eﬀect of
taxes on bilateral FDI ﬂows by including measures of the complexity of the tax code. Highly
complex tax systems impose costs on ﬁrms that have to understand and comply with all of
the various requirements. For multinational ﬁrms that are making a decision about where
to locate, the costs associated with a complicated tax code might oﬀset to some extent
attractions of a lower tax rate. This paper examines how measures of tax complexity aﬀect
the existence and level of bilateral FDI relationships for 16 OECD FDI-source countries
and 57 host countries.
We use data from the World Bank’s Doing Business survey to examine the eﬀect on
FDI ﬂows of the time and transactions burdens associated with paying taxes. These data
provide two measures that proxy for the complexity of complying with tax regulations
across countries. The ﬁrst is a measure of the amount of time it takes a representative ﬁrm
to process their taxes. The second is the number of payments the ﬁrm has to make. The
time required to comply with tax rules varies from 12 hours in the United Arab Emirates
to 2600 hours in Brazil, while the number of payments involved ranges from 3 in Norway
to 98 in Ukraine.
A large number of the potential source-host country pairs do not have any FDI ﬂows
between them. In examining the determinants of FDI ﬂows, it is therefore important to
control for the number of zeros in the data. For this reason, we use a Heckman selection
model of FDI participation and ﬂows, following the approach of the papers by Razin and
co-authors (2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008).
The number of payments and time to comply with tax obligations variables are found
to have signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on whether FDI ﬂows are present, although they do not
signiﬁcantly impact the level once the FDI relationship has been established. This result
holds even when a range of country speciﬁc controls are added, including other indicators
of the level of bureaucracy. In terms of its economic signiﬁcance, we estimate that a
10% reduction in tax complexity is approximately comparable to a one percentage point
reduction in the eﬀective corporate tax rate. Either of these changes would raise total FDI
inﬂows by approximately 6%.
21 Introduction
The negative eﬀect of tax rates on the ability of countries to attract foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) has been the topic of considerable research.1 Beyond the tax rate faced by
the multinational ﬁrm, a highly complex tax system imposes costs on ﬁrms that have to
understand and comply with all of the various requirements. For multinational ﬁrms that
are making a decision about where to locate, the costs associated with a complicated tax
code might oﬀset to some extent attractions of a lower tax rate. This paper examines how
measures of tax complexity aﬀect the existence and level of bilateral FDI relationships for
16 OECD FDI-source countries and 57 host countries.
We use data from the World Bank’s Doing Business survey to examine the eﬀect on
FDI ﬂows of the time and transactions burdens associated with paying taxes. These data
provide two measures that proxy for the complexity of complying with tax regulations
across countries. The ﬁrst is a measure of the amount of time it takes a representative ﬁrm
to process their taxes. The second is the number of payments the ﬁrm has to make. The
time required to comply with tax rules varies from 12 hours in the United Arab Emirates
to 2600 hours in Brazil, while the number of payments involved ranges from 3 in Norway
to 99 in Ukraine.
Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho and Shleifer (2008) use the World Bank data on
taxes and the number of tax payments to explain a range of country-level outcomes, includ-
ing total FDI inﬂows. They ﬁnd that both statutory and eﬀective tax rates have negative
eﬀects on FDI inﬂows, investment and entrepreneurship. They do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
relationship between the number of tax payments and total FDI inﬂows.2 However, fo-
cusing on total FDI as they do may miss some important information on the factors that
aﬀect the establishment of FDI links between countries. Looking at bilateral patterns of
FDI ﬂows, we observe a large number of zero values in the data. If tax complexity works
mainly by inhibiting the formation of FDI links, this eﬀect may not be apparent in an
analysis of total FDI.
In this paper we use OECD data to examine bilateral FDI ﬂows, controlling for zero
ﬂows. We use a gravity model speciﬁation relating the bilateral FDI to host and source
country characteristics, an approach shown by Razin, Sadka and Tong (2008) to work well
1See Blonigen (2005) for a review of the literature on determinants of FDI.
2They do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative relationship between number of payments and domestic entrepreneur-
ship measures.
3empirically and which is consistent with their theoretical framework. This is then extended
to include diﬀerent measures of tax rates and the proxies for the complexity of the tax
system.
Controlling for selection into a bilateral FDI relationship generates quite diﬀerent results
from those of Djankov et al (2008) - the number of payments and time to comply with tax
obligations variables are found to have signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on whether FDI ﬂows are
present. The eﬀect of tax complexity is mainly through this extensive margin (whether a
FDI-pair exists) and the subsequent intensive margin (level of FDI once a pair exists) is not
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the complexity variables. This result holds even when a range of
country speciﬁc controls are added, including other indicators of the level of bureaucracy.
In terms of its economic signiﬁcance, we estimate that a 10% reduction in tax complexity
is approximately comparable to a one percentage point reduction in the eﬀective corporate
tax rate. Either of these changes would raise total FDI inﬂows by approximately 6%.
Very little research to date has looked at the potential eﬀects of tax complexity on
FDI. One exception is a study by Edmiston, Mudd and Valev (2003), who found that
tax code complexity and uncertainty had a negative relationship with FDI inﬂows to the
countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. They used measures
taken directly from the tax legislation such as number of rates and number of lines in the
description of the tax base, whereas the Doing Business data are measured on the basis of
a representative ﬁrm’s experience of the operation of the tax system.
In a related strand of the literature, the negative eﬀect of time and bureaucratic delays
has been examined in the context of international trade and business start-up. Djankov,
Freund and Pham (2006) found that a 10% saving of time in exporting increased exports by
4%. The number of procedures and days to establish a business are examined by Djankov,
la Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), who ﬁnd that these measures of bureaucracy
are associated with signiﬁcant costs to business.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents
benchmark results of a gravity model of the factors determining FDI ﬂows. Section 4 then
extends the analysis by including the tax rates and complexity measures from the Doing
Business survey. Section 5 examines the economic signiﬁcance of the results by simulating
changes in the tax complexity measures and Section 6 concludes.
42 Data
2.1 Data on Tax Rates and Complexity
The data on tax rates and proxies for the complexity of the tax system come from the
World Bank Doing Business survey, described in detail in Djankov et al. (2008). The data
were compiled through a survey of accountants and tax lawyers in 85 countries in coop-
eration with PricewaterhouseCoopers. To ensure comparability across countries, the data
are based on a case study of a hypothetical representative ﬁrm examined across countries.
A range of assumptions were made about the structure of the business and hypothetical
ﬁnancial accounts were presented to the survey respondents to enable them to calculate the
company’s tax liabilities and costs of compliance.
The representative business is assumed to be a limited liability company operating
in the country’s largest city. It is entirely domestically owned and operates only in the
domestic market (no imports or exports). The ﬁrm has ﬁve owners and sixty employees. It
is involved in general manufacturing activities; speciﬁcally, it produces ceramic ﬂowerpots
and sells them at retail. It does not handle any products that might be subject to a special
tax regime. The components of the ﬁnancial accounts are constructed as multiples of the
country’s income per capita in local currency. Start-up capital is 102 times income per
capita and turnover is 1050 times income per capita. The company’s gross pretax margin
is 20 percent.
The tax measures used in this paper are the statutory corporate tax rate and the ﬁrst-
year eﬀective tax rate. The statutory tax rate is the highest bracket of all taxes on corporate
income.3 The eﬀective tax rate is obtained by dividing the total corporate tax the ﬁrm
pays by its pretax earnings.
The Doing Business survey also includes measures of the complexity of the tax system
for the representative ﬁrm. The two measures used are the length of time the ﬁrm must
spend to meet its tax obligations and the number of payments that have to be made.
More speciﬁcally, the time variable records how many hours it takes the ﬁrm to prepare,
ﬁle and pay its corporate income tax, sales tax and labour taxes. This includes the time
taken to complete all necessary tax forms, time to prepare accounts or calculations for
tax purposes that would not be covered by regular accounting work and the time need to
3If there are diﬀerent corporate taxes (for instance federal, state and local), the deductibility of one or
more of those taxes is taken into account when computing the tax base for corporate income.
5make the payment online or at the tax oﬃce. The tax payments indicator reﬂects the total
number of taxes and contributions to be paid, the method and frequency of payment and
the number of agencies involved for the case of this standardised ﬁrm.
Figure 1 shows the length of time required to comply with the tax codes in the countries
used in this paper. The average number of hours is 388. The responses range from a low
of 12 hours in the United Arab Emirates to 2600 in Brazil. If the outlying observations
of Ukraine and Brazil are excluded then the average falls to 306 hours, with the longest
amount of time being in the Czech Republic where it takes 930 hours. The average number
of tax payments that have to be made is 30. The number of payments ranges from a high of
98 (in the Ukraine) to a low of 3 payments (Norway). The two measures of complexity are
positively, but not very highly correlated, as shown in Figure 2. The correlation coeﬃcient
between the two measures is 0.33.
In order to check if the tax complexity variables are proxying for more than a general
level of bureaucracy in the host country, we also include an additional measure of red tape
unrelated to taxes for robustness. The variable used is business start-up costs, deﬁned as the
cost of registering a new business as a percentage of per capita income. This variable also
comes from the World Bank Doing Business data (see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer 2002). Table 1 provides a list of all the variables used and their sources.
2.2 FDI and Country Variables
The main variable of interest is bilateral FDI ﬂows. The FDI data are cross-sectional for
2002 and come from the OECD International Direct Investment report (converted into US
dollars). The 16 FDI source countries are all OECD members, while the 57 host countries
include both OECD and non-OECD members. The full list of source and host countries is
given in Table 2. A considerable number of the country pairs have no FDI ﬂows - just over
forty percent of the observations in the total data have bilateral FDI of zero. FDI ﬂows
are more likely when the host country is also in the OECD, with seventy percent of these
observations being positive, compared to forty-four percent positive observations when the
host country is not in the OECD.
In addition to the tax rate and tax system complexity variables, a range of country
speciﬁc factors are also controlled for in the empirical approach. We use some standard
gravity-style variables to capture market size and trading costs between the source and host
6countries. The data on GDP (in US dollars) and population come from the Penn World
Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006). Distance is measured as between capital cities
and a dummy variable for a common oﬃcial language in the two countries is also used.
The data for these two variables is sourced from Jon Haveman’s website, a standard data
source for gravity regressions.4 As a measure of the relative skill levels of the countries, we
use the diﬀerence in years of schooling between source and host countries. This comes from
the Barro-Lee data on educational attainment.
3 Benchmark Speciﬁcation
As we discussed in the description of the FDI data, a relatively large number of the potential
source-host country pairs do not have any FDI ﬂows between them. In examining the
determinants of FDI ﬂows, it is therefore important to control for the number of zeros in
the data. For this reason, we use a Heckman selection model of FDI participation and ﬂows,
following the approach in papers by Razin and co-authors (2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008).
The selection margin is modeled in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004) as resulting
from unobserved set-up costs in the FDI decision. Productivity shocks are added in Razin,
Sadka and Tong (2008) and the eﬀects of taxes are examined in Razin, Rubinstein and
Sadka (2005) and Razin and Sadka (2007). The empirical methodology in each of the
papers is to control for the selection into FDI using the Heckman approach and to include a
range of country variables commonly used in the gravity speciﬁcation for estimating trade
ﬂows. They ﬁnd that this two stage approach of modelling initial selection into FDI and
then controlling for selection, when modelling the bilateral FDI ﬂows, provides a signiﬁcant
improvement on speciﬁcations that do not make this adjustment.
To estimate the determinants of the FDI ﬂows, we use a Heckman selection model which
controls for the ﬁrm’s endogenous selection into FDI. The ﬁrst stage of the estimation is
the decision to establish a FDI ﬂow. The proﬁt-maximising multinational ﬁrm in the source
country makes this decision based on expected proﬁts from locating in the host country,
taking into account the ﬁxed costs of entering the new market. If the expected proﬁts are
positive, then the ﬁrm will locate in the new country and FDI ﬂows between the source
and host country will be observed at the aggregate level. The FDI relationship status of
4http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/Data/Gravity/dist.txt
7the two countries s and h is denoted by FDIdummysh where
FDIdummysh = 1 if bZs + cZh + ǫsh > 0 (1)
= 0 otherwise (2)
The source country will invest in the host country if its expected current and future proﬁts
from doing so are greater than the costs involved. These proﬁts depend on both source and
host country-speciﬁc factors denoted by Zs and Zh that include variables such as market
size, distance between them and the costs of doing business, including the tax regime. The
residual term is esh. Once an FDI ﬂow has been established, the second stage is deciding on
its level. In the second stage, where the determinants of the FDI are modelled, the ﬁrms’s
endogenous selection into FDI is controlled for by including a Inverse Mill’s ratio generated
in the ﬁrst stage. The FDI level equation for observed FDI (FDI∗) is estimated as
FDI∗
sh = bXs + bXh + υsh (3)
With:
FDIsh = FDI∗
sh if FDIdummysh = 1 (4)
FDIsh = 0 if FDIdummysh = 0 (5)
The observed FDI level is zero if no FDI relationship exists. If the FDI decision has been
made in favour of investing in the host country, its level will be determined by a vector
of source and host country characteristics and by other eﬀects captured by the error term
ush. The vector of country characteristics included in the FDI level equation, Xs and Xh,
can include some of the same variables as Zs and Zh in the selection equation. However,
in order to identify the equations, an additional variable is ideally required in the selection
equation. The correlation between the error terms (ǫsh,υsh) is given by ρ, and the two
decisions (i.e. to establish FDI and how much) are related if ρ is not equal to zero. In such
a case, estimating only the market coverage equation would induce a sample selection bias,
which is avoided by estimating both equations as proposed by Heckman (1979). Empirically
the two stages are estimated jointly using the maximum likelihood method.
The benchmark speciﬁcation without tax variables is presented in Table 3. The depen-
dent variable in the selection equation is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if there is a
positive FDI relationship between the source and host countries, and 0 otherwise. In the
second stage, the dependent variable is the log of the FDI ﬂow. As the Heckman approach
8requires diﬀerent variables in the selection and ﬂow equations for identiﬁcation, we use a
very general strategy where source country dummies are included in the ﬁrst stage to pick
up all source country variation. The second stage then restricts the source country variables
to GDP per capita and population. This allows us to focus on the eﬀects in both stages on
characteristics of the host country and host-source links.
GDP per capita in the host country is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with both
the existence and the level of FDI ﬂows. The same is true of the host country population
and sharing a common language, while distance is negatively associated with both FDI
selection and ﬂows. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, source country GDP per capita and popu-
lation are positively associated with FDI ﬂows. However, when we add the diﬀerence in
schooling variable in the second speciﬁcation, source country GDP per capita is no longer
signiﬁcant. The population eﬀect remains signiﬁcant. A dummy variable to describe if the
host country is in the OECD is signiﬁcant for the selection equation (ﬁnal column) but
does not impact the amount. In this, and all subsequent speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
positive coeﬃcient for the Inverse Mills ration (or Heckman correction) λ, indicating that
the unobservables in the selection and ﬂow equations are positively correlated with one
another and that not controlling for the selection eﬀect creates a bias.
The systematically positive coeﬃcients on schooling diﬀerences between the source and
host country are the most notable diﬀerence between these and the Razin results, where the
education variables tend to be insigniﬁcant or negative except in Razin and Sadka (2007).
A priori the schooling diﬀerences could work in either direction, depending on the type of
FDI involved. Markusen and Maskus (2002) and Davies (2008) use endowments of skilled
labour to distinguish between the horizontal and vertical motivations for FDI. Horizontal
FDI is higher between countries of similar skill levels since this facilitates production of the
multinational’s product in both countries, whereas vertical investment would be expected
to be higher if there are larger skill diﬀerences (and hence greater diﬀerences in factor
prices) between the source and host countries.
94 Tax Rates and Complexity Measures
4.1 Results
Tax rates are added to the benchmark speciﬁcation in Table 4. The ﬁrst panel includes the
top statutory rate of corporate tax in the host country. We ﬁnd that this tax rate has a
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on both FDI selection and on subsequent FDI ﬂows. The second
panel ﬁnds a similar result using the eﬀective corporate tax rate as an alternative measure.
The coeﬃcients for both the selection and ﬂow equations of the eﬀective tax rate is slightly
lower compared to when the statutory rate was used. The combined economic impact of
the selection and ﬂow coeﬃcients will be discussed in the next section. The inclusion of
the tax measures does not have any appreciable eﬀect on the magnitudes of the standard
gravity variables that were included in the benchmark speciﬁcation.
The next speciﬁcation adds the time spent on complying with tax requirements. The
ﬁrst column of Table 5 reports results from a OLS regression that does not control for
selection into having a positive FDI ﬂow. In this speciﬁcation there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on FDI from the time variable, which is consistent with the aggregate results of Djankov,
Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho and Shleifer (2008). In the next panel of Table 5 we use the
Heckman selection technique to control for the large number of zero observations in the
bilateral data. When this selection control is added, we ﬁnd that the time to comply
variable is signiﬁcantly negatively related to both selection and subsequent FDI ﬂows.
However, when the statutory and eﬀective tax rates are included (in the third and fourth
panels respectively), we ﬁnd that the time variable no longer aﬀects the intensive margin
of FDI but it remains highly signiﬁcant in the selection equation. The negative coeﬃcients
on the tax rates are slightly lower when we control for the complexity of the tax system,
but there is no qualitative change in any of the other control variables.
The alternative proxy for tax complexity is the number of payments that have to be
made by the representative ﬁrm. The results for this measure are presented in Table 6 and
are broadly similar to those for the time measure. The basic OLS speciﬁcation does not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect but when selection is controlled for we ﬁnd that the payments
variable negatively eﬀects the establishment of a FDI relationship between countries. Both
measures of complexity are signiﬁcant for the selection into FDI, but not for the subsequent
FDI ﬂows once they are observed. Therefore, the main impact of both the complexity
measures is to inhibit FDI ﬂows from occurring. This ﬁnding implies that a high level of
10tax complexity can be thought of as analogous to a ﬁxed cost that ﬁrms must decide to
cover before establishing a FDI ﬂow. As with any ﬁxed cost, it aﬀects the set-up decision
but not the subsequent ﬂows. Tax rates on the other hand look more like variable costs,
being proportional to the level of activity.
4.2 Alternative Speciﬁcations
It is possible that the measures of tax complexity included above are actually proxying for
a broader concept of administrative bureaucracy in the host country. To check if this is the
case, Table 7 adds a further measure of “red tape” to examine the robustness of the tax
complexity results. The measure used is the costs involved in registering a new business.
The wide variation in how much it costs to establish a new business and the extent to
which this is correlated with other measures of bureaucracy and governance is examined by
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002). Although this indicator is itself
negative and signiﬁcant, it does not change the eﬀect of the tax complexity variables.5
Figure 2 showed that the two complexity measures were positively but not very strongly
correlated. Table 8 presents regression results when both measures are entered simultane-
ously. The basic result is unchanged, with both proxies for complexity negatively and
signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the extensive FDI margin. Table 8 also shows the results from using
relative measures of tax complexity; we include time and payments of the FDI-host coun-
try relative to those of the source country. One might expect ﬁrms from a low-complexity
country to only consider those that are less complex than their home country. The relative
time variable is indeed negative and signiﬁcant, once again working primarily through the
selection eﬀect. The relative payments variable, on the other hand, does not have any
signiﬁcant eﬀect.
A number of further robustness checks were carried out. The regressions were run
omitting the two main outliers (Brazil and Ukraine) but the results were qualitatively
unchanged. Additionally, we tried including interactions terms between the complexity
measures and tax rates to see if they reinforced or oﬀset one another but the results were
not signiﬁcant.
5Other measures such as time and number of procedures to establish a business were also tried, but the
results were unchanged.
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5.1 Economic Signiﬁcance: Total Eﬀects
The regression results show that the tax complexity measures are statistically signiﬁcant
in the FDI selection equation. This section examines the economic signiﬁcance of the
results and asks how much additional FDI could a country expect to receive if they reduced
the complexity of their tax system. To do this, we compute the predicted values of the
probability of observing a FDI ﬂow and of the value of the FDI for diﬀerent levels of the
tax rate and tax complexity.
ˆ fdi = ˆ p. ˆ value
More speciﬁcally, the estimated FDI ﬂows ˆ fdi are the product of the linear prediction
of the probability of a FDI relationship being established ˆ p (from the selection equation)
and the predicted value of the FDI amount ˆ value (from the second stage of the Heckman
regressions). The ﬁtted values from the original data are used to measure the eﬀects of
simulated changes in the levels of complexity. For comparison, a change in the tax rate
is also simulated. The ﬁtted values for the hypothetical reductions in the tax complexity
variables or tax rates are calculated using the same coeﬃcients as the ﬁtted values from
the regression output and keeping the values of all other variables unchanged.
The ﬁrst row in Table 9 estimates the eﬀect of a one percentage point reduction in the
eﬀective corporate tax rate would be to increase total FDI inﬂows by 5.8%.6 Comparing
this to previous evidence on the eﬀect of tax rates shows that this is a somewhat stronger
eﬀect than average but well within the bounds previously found in the literature: A meta-
analysis of the eﬀect of corporate tax rates on FDI by de Mooij and Ederveen (2008) found
an average semi-elasticity of -3.3. The standard deviation of the 427 papers that they
include in the analysis was 4.4.
The eﬀect on total FDI of reducing tax complexity by 10% is similar in magnitude to
a reduction in the corporate tax rate of 1 percentage point. Reducing the time taken to
comply with tax requirements by 10% is predicted to increase FDI by 6.3%.7 The eﬀect
of reducing the number of tax payments by 10% is predicted to increase FDI by 5.5%, a
6The coeﬃcients used in the prediction are from the ﬁnal panel of Table 5.
7The coeﬃcients used in the prediction are from the ﬁnal panel of Table 5.
12slightly smaller eﬀect than reducing taxes or time.8
The second panel in Table 9 compares the average predicted probabilities of a FDI rela-
tionship existing between two countries (calculated from a linear prediction of the selection
stage). A 10% reduction in either time or number of payments increases this probability
by 1.2 percentage points. The eﬀect of a change in the tax rate on the probability of a
FDI-pair is lower (0.8 percentage points), although the total eﬀect on FDI was similar. This
is because the tax change aﬀects both the selection and ﬂow equations, whereas changes in
the tax complexity variables worked mainly through their eﬀect on selection.
5.2 Economic Signiﬁcance: Country Examples
The eﬀects reported in Table 9 are for the entire sample. As the eﬀect of changing tax
complexity levels on individual countries works through both the probabilities of entering
into FDI relationships as well as the subsequent amounts, the combined impact is not linear.
Table 10 gives some individual examples for four countries with diﬀerent complexity levels
and how the reductions in tax complexity and tax rates would aﬀect their total FDI and
the changes in their probabilities of having positive FDI pairings.
The representative countries are one with a very low current level of the time measure
of complexity (Ireland; 76 hours), a country with approximately average time to comply
(USA; 325 hours), a relatively high complexity country (China; 872 hours) and the extreme
outlier (Brazil; 2600 hours).
The eﬀect of changes in complexity varies by the initial level, with a greater estimated
return for reducing complexity going to countries where the current level is highest. In the
example of reducing the time taken to comply with tax requirements by 10%, total FDI is
estimated to increase by 4.2% in Ireland, which has a particulaly low starting complexity
level. The same change in time to comply would increase total FDI in the average complex-
ity country, the USA, by 6.9% and around the same for the higher complexity country of
China (a 6.1% increase), holding all other factors constant. Reducing the time by 10% in
Brazil gets the largest payoﬀ, increasing predicted FDI by 9.3%. A similar pattern applies
to increases in the average probability of positive FDI matches - the change in Ireland is 1
percentage point (pp), 1.2pp for the USA and China and 1.2pp for Brazil.
Halving the time taken to complete tax obligations would increase FDI by approximately
8The coeﬃcients used in the prediction are from the ﬁnal panel of Table 6.
13one-third for countries with average-to-high initial time requirements (35.4% for the USA
and 31.9% for China). The increase for Brazil is 46.2% if time requirements were reduced
by 50%.
The pattern of eﬀects for reducing the number of payments by 10% or 50% is similar,
although the magnitudes of the changes are smaller. China has the highest original number
of payments of the four representative examples (48 payments); a 50% reduction would
increase total FDI to China by 31.1%. The same percentage reduction in Ireland, with an
initial 8 tax payments, would increase FDI by 21.3%.
For comparison with the complexity predictions, the ﬁnal panel of Table 10 presents the
predicted eﬀects of a 1 percentage point reduction in eﬀective corporate tax rates. Consis-
tent with the aggregate results, the average-to-high complexity countries of the USA and
China show that the eﬀects of a 1pp change in tax rates are almost identical in magnitude
to a 10% reduction in time - either change would predict a 6.9% increase in FDI for the
USA for example. For the higher complexity example country, Brazil, the impact on FDI of
reducing the tax rate (8%) would be less than if it reduced the time requirement (increase
in FDI of 9.3%). Only for Ireland, where the initial tax complexity measure is extremely
low, is the impact on FDI of reducing taxes (5.1%) greater than the impact of reducing the
time requirement (4.2%), despite the fact that Ireland also has a very low initial eﬀective
corporate tax rate. These examples show that tax complexity exerts a strong disincentive
to FDI and that reducing this complexity could yield signiﬁcant returns in increased FDI.
This is particularly the case for countries with higher initial levels of tax complexity.
6 Conclusions
The inﬂuence of taxes on foreign direct investment may be more complicated than a simple
comparison of rates across countries. The importance of distinguishing eﬀective tax rates
from statutory rates for example is well known. This paper adds a further dimension to
the eﬀect of taxes on bilateral FDI ﬂows by including measures of the complexity of the
tax code.
We use the World Bank Doing Business proxies for tax complexity of the time (in hours)
required for a standardised ﬁrm to comply with its tax obligations and the number of sep-
arate payments it would have to make. Both measures are signiﬁcantly and negatively
related to the existence of a FDI relationship between countries, although they do not sub-
14sequently have a strong eﬀect on the level of the FDI ﬂows. In other words, the complexity
measures aﬀect FDI primarily through the extensive margin.
The measures of tax complexity are robust to the inclusion of a range of country level
variables and a further proxy for the general level of bureaucracy. In terms of its economic
signiﬁcance, we estimate that a 10% reduction in tax complexity is approximately compa-
rable to a one percentage point reduction in the eﬀective corporate tax rate. Either of these
changes would raise total FDI inﬂows by approximately 6%.
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17Table 1: Data Sources
Variable Source Deﬁnition
FDI OECD International Direct Bilateral FDI ﬂows in 2002 in US$
Investment between OECD countries and
from OECD to non-OECD.
GDP Penn World Tables Gross Domestic Product in US$.
Population Penn World Tables Population
Distance Jon Haveman website* Great circle distance in km between
Investment cities.
Language Jon Haveman website* Dummy variable equal to one
if host and source countries have
a common oﬃcial language.
Education Barro-Lee dataset Average years of schooling
in total population.
Statutory tax Djankov et al. (2008) Tax rate (%) for highest bracket
of all taxes on corporate income.
Eﬀective tax Djankov et al. (2008) Tax rate (%) given by dividing
total corporate tax company pays
by its pretax earnings.
Tax time requirement World Bank Time (in hours per year)
Doing Business data to prepare, ﬁle and pay
corporate, sales and labor taxes.
Tax payments World Bank Indicator reﬂects total number
Doing Business data of taxes paid, method of payment,
frequency of payment and number
of agencies involved.
Start costs World Bank Cost of registering a new business
Doing Business data as % per capita income.
*Available at:
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html
18Table 2: List of Countries
Source Countries Host Countries
Australia Algeria Hong Kong Poland
Austria Argentina Hungary Portugal
Belgium-Lux Australia Iceland Romania
Denmark Austria India Russia
Finland Belgium-Lux Indonesia Saudi Arabia
France Brazil Ireland Singapore
Germany Bulgaria Israel SlovakR
Italy Canada Italy Slovenia
Japan Chile Japan South Africa
Korea China Korea Spain
Netherlands Colombia Kuwait Sweden
Spain Costa Rica Malaysia Switzerland
Sweden CzechR Mexico Thailand
Switzerland Denmark Morocco Turkey
UK Egypt Netherlands UAE




19Table 3: Benchmark Gravity Model of FDI Selection and Flows
Selection Ln(FDI) Selection Ln(FDI) Selection Ln(FDI)
Ln GDP per capita: Host 0.43*** 1.95*** 0.62*** 2.26*** 0.47*** 2.21***
(0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.22) (0.15) (0.23)
Ln Population: Host 0.32*** 0.81*** 0.33*** 0.81*** 0.30*** 0.78***
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10)
Ln Distance -0.34*** -0.78*** -0.24*** -0.74*** -0.14** -0.72***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Language 0.70*** 1.35*** 0.62** 1.26*** 0.70*** 1.24***
(0.26) (0.35) (0.26) (0.34) (0.26) (0.34)
Schooling Diﬀerence - - 0.03 0.14*** 0.07* 0.15***
- - (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Host in OECD - - - - 0.54*** 0.08
- - - - (0.17) (0.28)
Ln GDP per capita: Source - 2.06*** - 0.71 - 0.67
- (0.67) - (0.86) - (0.86)
Ln Population: Source - 0.78*** - 0.80*** - 0.79***
- (0.10) - (0.09) - (0.08)
Source country dummy Yes No Yes No Yes No
Lambda 1.09*** 1.07*** -1.56***
(0.29) (0.34) (0.26)
Log likelihood -1265 -1055 -1049
Observations 784 644 644
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
20Table 4: FDI and Tax Rates
Selection Ln(FDI) Selection Ln(FDI)
Statutory Tax Rate -3.64*** 5.96*** - -
(1.02) (1.76) - -
Eﬀective Tax Rate - - -3.32*** -5.08***
- - (1.10) (1.86)
Ln GDP per capita: Host 0.62*** 2.39*** 0.48*** 2.13***
(0.16) (0.24) (0.16) (0.23)
Ln Population: Host 0.31*** 0.92*** 0.23*** 0.76***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09)
Ln Distance -0.18** -0.73*** -0.16** -0.70***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Language 0.71*** 1.25*** 0.72*** 1.27***
(0.27) (0.34) (0.27) (0.34)
Schooling Diﬀerence 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Host in OECD 0.42** 0.14 0.49*** 0.25
(0.18) (0.28) (0.19) (0.29)
Ln GDP per capita: Source - 0.18 - 0.34
- (0.86) - (0.86)
Ln Population: Source - 0.82*** - 0.82***
- (0.08) - (0.08)
Source country dummy Yes No Yes No
λ 1.09*** 1.08***
(0.28) (0.29)
Log likelihood -996 -999
Observations 588 588
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
21Table 5: FDI and Time to Comply with Taxes
OLS Selection Ln(FDI) Selection Ln(FDI) Selection Ln(FDI)
Ln Time to Comply -0.12 -0.44*** -0.33** -0.38*** -0.19 -0.42*** -0.25
(0.15) (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.16)
Statutory Tax Rate - - - -2.86*** -5.28*** - -
- - - (1.06) (1.76) - -
Eﬀective Tax Rate -3.03* - - - - -2.83** -4.45**
(1.74) - - - - (1.12) (1.84)
Ln GDP per capita: Host 1.99*** 0.31** 2.06*** 0.48*** 2.28*** 0.35** 2.03***
(0.23) (0.16) (0.24) (0.17) (0.25) (0.16) (0.24)
Ln Population: Host 0.67*** 0.36*** 0.82*** 0.34*** 0.92*** 0.28*** 0.79***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09)
Ln Distance -0.60*** -0.13** -0.71*** -0.18** -0.72*** -0.16** -0.70***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Language 1.13*** 0.63** 1.16*** 0.63** 1.19*** 0.64** 1.19***
(0.32) (0.27) (0.33) (0.28) (0.33) (0.28) (0.33)
Schooling Diﬀerence 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.19***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Host in OECD 0.05 0.61*** 0.10 0.44** 0.14 0.52*** 0.23
(0.28) (0.17) (0.28) (0.19) (0.28) (0.19) (0.29)
Ln GDP per capita: Source 0.52 - 0.48 - 0.09 - 0.21
(0.83) - (0.85) - (0.86) - (0.86)
Ln Population: Source 0.67*** - 0.78*** - 0.82*** - 0.81***
(0.07) - (0.08) - (0.08) - (0.08)
Source country dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No
λ - 0.87*** 1.03*** 1.00***
- (0.37) (0.29) (0.31)
Log likelihood R2=0.46 -1040 -990 -992
Observations 372 644 588 588
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
22Table 6: FDI and Number of Tax Payments
OLS Selection Ln(FDI) Selection Ln(FDI) Selection Ln(FDI)
Ln Number Tax Payments 0.15 -0.51*** -0.18 -0.38*** -0.08 -0.39*** -0.05
(0.14) (0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16)
Statutory Tax Rate - - - -2.58** -5.57*** - -
- - - (1.07) (1.75) - -
Eﬀective Tax Rate -3.63** - - - - -2.30** -4.66**
(1.77) - - - - (1.14) (1.83)
Ln GDP per capita: Host 2.17*** -0.04 2.02*** 0.23 2.28*** 0.11 2.07***
(0.25) (0.18) (0.26) (0.20) (0.27) (0.19) (0.26)
Ln Population: Host 0.65*** 0.27*** 0.75*** 0.29*** 0.90*** 0.22*** 0.74***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09)
Ln Distance -0.59*** -0.17** -0.72*** -0.21*** -0.74*** -0.20*** -0.71***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Language 1.16*** 0.67** 1.21*** 0.68** 1.24*** 0.69** 1.25***
(0.32) (0.27) (0.33) (0.27) (0.33) (0.27) (0.33)
Schooling Diﬀerence 0.17*** 0.06 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.12** 0.17***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Host in OECD 0.02 0.63*** 0.05 0.45** 0.12 0.51*** 0.20
(0.28) (0.18) (0.29) (0.19) (0.28) (0.19) (0.29)
Ln GDP per capita: Source 0.57 - 0.72 - 0.26 - 0.42
(0.83) - (0.85) - (0.86) - (0.85)
Ln Population: Source 0.69*** - 0.77*** - 0.82*** - 0.81***
(0.07) - (0.09) - (0.08) - (0.08)
Source country dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No
λ - 0.83** 1.06*** 1.03***
- (0.40) (0.28) (0.30)
Log likelihood R2=0.48 -1035 -989 -991
Observations 372 644 588 588
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
23Table 7: Tax Complexity and Start-up Costs
Selection Ln(FDI) Selection Ln(FDI)
Ln Start-up cost -0.19*** -0.10 -0.17** -0.15
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Ln Time to comply -0.33*** -0.19 - -
(0.11) (0.16) - -
Ln Number of Payments - - -0.30*** 0.05
- - (0.11) (0.17)
Eﬀective Tax Rate -3.20*** -4.04** -2.75** -4.50**
(1.15) (1.88) (1.20) (1.88)
Ln GDP per capita: Host 0.15 1.90*** -0.02 1.94***
(0.18) (0.26) (0.20) (0.28)
Ln Population: Host 0.26*** 0.74*** 0.21*** 0.72***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09)
Ln Distance -0.21*** -0.71*** -0.23*** -0.72***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11)
Language 0.59** 1.16*** 0.63** 1.19***
(0.28) (0.33) (0.27) (0.33)
Schooling Diﬀerence 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.20***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Host in OECD 0.61*** 0.25 0.59*** 0.24
(0.20) (0.29) (0.20) (0.29)
Ln GDP per capita: Source - -0.05 - 0.003
- (0.88) - (0.87)
Ln Population: Source - 0.80*** - 0.81***
- (0.09) - (0.09)
Source country dummy Yes No Yes No
λ 0.85*** 0.91***
(0.36) (0.34)
Log likelihood -967 -967
Observations 575 575
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
24Table 8: Alternative Speciﬁcations
Selection Ln(FDI) Selection Ln(FDI) Selection Ln(FDI)
Ln Time to comply -0.36*** -0.24 - - - -
(0.11) (0.16) - - - -
Ln Number of Payments -0.34*** -0.02 - - - -
(0.11) (0.16) - - - -
Relative Time - - -0.07** 0.04 - -
- - (0.03) (0.05) - -
Relative Payments - - - - -0.03 -0.003
- - - - (0.02) (0.03)
Eﬀective Tax Rate -2.02* -4.23** -3.51*** -4.80** -3.25*** -4.98***
(1.15) (1.83) (1.11) (1.86) (1.11) (1.87)
Ln GDP per capita: Host 0.05 2.01*** 0.50*** 2.14*** 0.41** 2.13***
(0.19) (0.27) (0.16) (0.23) (0.17) (0.23)
Ln Population: Host 0.28*** 0.77*** 0.26*** 0.74*** 0.23*** 0.76***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09)
Ln Distance -0.19** -0.70*** -0.14* -0.69*** -0.17** -0.70***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Language 0.62** 1.18*** 0.69** 1.26*** 0.72*** 1.27***
(0.28) (0.33) (0.28) (0.33) (0.27) (0.34)
Schooling Diﬀerence 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.17***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Host in OECD 0.54*** 0.19 0.48** 0.23 0.49** 0.24
(0.20) (0.29) (0.19) (0.29) (0.19) (0.29)
Ln GDP per capita: Source - 0.27 - 0.30 - 0.34
- (0.85) - (0.85) - (0.87)
Ln Population: Source - 0.80*** - 0.81*** - 0.76***
- (0.08) - (0.08) - (0.09)
Source country dummy Yes No Yes No Yes No
λ 0.95*** 0.97*** 1.05***
(0.32) (0.33) (0.32)
Log likelihood -986 -994 -999
Observations 588 588 588
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
25Table 9: Predicted Economic Eﬀects of Reducing Tax Complexity
Predicted Percentage Change Change in Average Probability
Total FDI of FDI Match
Reduce tax rate by 1pp 0.058 0.008
Reduce time by 10% 0.063 0.012
Reduce payments by 10% 0.055 0.012
26Table 10: Predicted Eﬀects on FDI for Selected Countries
Ireland USA China Brazil
Current Time to Comply 76 325 872 2600
10% Reduction in Time
Predicted Percentage Change in Total FDI 4.2 6.9 6.1 9.3
Change in Average Probability of FDI Match 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.4
50% Reduction in Time
Predicted Percentage Change in Total FDI 22.8 35.4 31.9 46.2
Change in Average Probability of FDI Match 5.8 7.4 7.6 8.9
Current Number of Payments 8 10 48 23
10% Reduction in Payments
Predicted Percentage Change in Total FDI 4.1 5.6 6.0 5.5
Change in Average Probability of FDI Match 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0
50% Reduction in Payments
Predicted Percentage Change in Total FDI 21.3 28.3 31.1 27.6
Change in Average Probability of FDI Match 6.4 6.5 7.6 6.4
Current Eﬀective Tax Rate 9.6 18.2 15.7 15.5
1 Percentage Point Reduction in Tax
Predicted Percentage Change in Total FDI 5.1 6.9 6.2 8.0
Change in Average Probability of FDI Match 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
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